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We analyse a model of vertical diﬀerentiation focusing on the trade-oﬀ be-
tween entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, ver-
sus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product.
We show that, in a relevant parameter region, there exists a unique equilib-
rium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower. This
happens when the time span spent by the leader as a monopolist matters the
most, i.e., in correspondence of suﬃciently low discount rate values, low costs
of quality improvement and high consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.
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An apparently well established result in the theory of vertically diﬀerentiated
oligopoly states that earlier entrants supply goods of higher quality than
later entrants, in that the high-quality products earn higher proﬁts than
low-quality alternatives (see, inter alia, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980;
Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992, 1995). A
general proof of this result for every convex ﬁxed-cost function of quality
improvement is provided by Lehmann-Grube (1997).1
Two fundamental assumptions are at the basis of this result. The ﬁrst
is that consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality is uniformly dis-
tributed over a given support. Since the density of consumers (i.e., demand)
is the same at any income level, the top-quality market niche is the most
proﬁtable. Therefore, in a static game, ﬁrms obviously prefer to enter with
a product characterized by the highest possible quality.
The second assumption concerns the time horizon considered in the above
mentioned literature. Entry in a vertically diﬀerentiated market is usually
analyzed within a single-period extensive form game. However, if one models
the entry problem in an explicit dynamic setup, an obvious trade-oﬀ imme-
diately appears, even maintaining the previous assumption. In order to enter
with an high quality product, the ﬁrm has to wait for the R&D activity to
take place and consequently it looses monopoly proﬁts. However, postpon-
ing entry, the ﬁrm is able to produce a higher quality good, obtaining thus
higher proﬁts. A static model does not allow to assess the possibility that
there exists such a trade-oﬀ between early innovation and the attainment of
a dominant position in the market.
Although it is generally asserted that quality may result from ﬁrms’ R&D
eﬀorts, this aspect of vertical product diﬀerentiation has received a relatively
scanty attention, the development phase being summarized by a cost function
which does not account for the time elapsed before the good is produced and
then marketed. To our knowledge, relevant contributions dealing explicitly
with the R&D activity are Beath et al. (1987); Motta (1992); Rosenkranz
(1995, 1997) and Dutta et al. (1995). These papers investigate the incentive
towards R&D cooperation (Motta, 1992; Rosenkranz, 1995) and the rela-
tionship between R&D and the persistence of quality leadership (Beath et
al., 1987; Rosenkranz, 1997). Dutta et al. (1995) analyses strategic timing
1Aoki and Prusa (1997) adopt a speciﬁc case of the cost function analysed by Lehmann-
Grube (1997), to investigate the consequences on proﬁts, consumer surplus and social
welfare of the timing of investment in product quality in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly
where the market stage is played in the price space. To this regard, see also Lambertini
(1999).
1in the adoption of a new technology leading to product diﬀerentiation and
quality improvements. All of these papers maintain that being the quality
leader (i.e., supplying the highest quality in the market) entails higher proﬁts
than the rivals.
We present a simple model of vertical diﬀerentiation focusing upon the
trade-oﬀ between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low
quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a su-
perior product. We retain the assumption of a uniform income distribution,
that would make it proﬁtable to produce a high quality good in a static game,
but relax the assumption of a static extensive form game. We prove that in
our model there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a
lower quality than the follower, for a signiﬁcant set of parameter values.2
This highlights that an unfavorable position in duopoly (or oligopoly), due
to a lower quality than the rivals’, may well be more than balanced by the
monopoly rent enjoyed ad interim with lower development costs. Therefore,
it appears that the established wisdom stating that early entry goes along
with high quality (and proﬁts) is not robust to a fully ﬂedged investigation
of the role of calendar time in shaping endogenously ﬁrms’ incentives.
The intuition for the result is as follows. In our dynamic version of vertical
diﬀerentiation, in equilibrium it is still optimal to diﬀerentiate. Therefore,
the only possible equilibria prescribe either that the ﬁrst ﬁrm enters with a
high quality and the second one with a lower one or the opposite. The earlier
entrant has the possibility to choose among those two equilibrium outcomes.
He will prefer to enter with a low quality depending upon parameter values,
namely if the cost of R&D is low, the interest rate is low and/or consumers’
marginal willingness to pay for quality is high. The reason is that for these
parameter values, the quality chosen by any ﬁrm is high. If the second ﬁrm
wishes to enter with a higher quality than the leader, it needs to choose
a very high one and therefore to engage in a very long R&D phase. This
will allow the leader to enjoy the monopoly proﬁts for a very long period,
compensating the eventual loss of proﬁts in the competitive phase.
Several real-world examples can be brought forward to support our analy-
sis. One such example is provided by the evolution of the market for digital
cameras, where earlier entrants (mainly Japanese or South Korean ﬁrms)
were primarily interested in meeting the largest possible fraction of the po-
tential demand with low- to mid-quality varieties. Even their top-notch prod-
ucts were (and still are) no match for their highest quality rival that decided
2>From a diﬀerent setting, Dutta et al. (1995) also derive an equilibrium where the
ﬁrst entrant produces a lower quality than the second entrant. However, in their model the
later entrant makes more proﬁts. As it will become clear in the remainder, this conclusion
rests upon the shape of the cost function.
2to enter the market only a few years later, namely Leitz Wetzlar, ﬁrst with
the Digilux 1 and currently with the Digilux 2. It is fairly obvious that the
ﬂow of proﬁts accruing to, say, Fuji, Nikon, Konika Minolta and the like is
individually much larger than Leitz Wetzlar’s. Another example of the same
kind can be found in the medical industry, where the ﬁrst generation dis-
posable surgical gloves were neither anallergic nor latex-free. In particular,
the second generation of disposable gloves was studied by other ﬁrms in the
same industry, to meet the needs of medics, becoming hence anallergic, and
only later, with the third generation, we have observed the availability of
latex-free gloves apt for use with patients subject to the risk of extremely
dangerous anaphylactic shocks. This chain of improvements of course has
ultimately involved the supply of three types of disposable gloves to diﬀerent
sections of the overall surgical demand, with a monotonically increasing price
schedule reﬂecting the increase in intrinsic product quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model
of vertical diﬀerentiation is laid out in section 2. Section 3 describes the
solution of all admissible subgames. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the
whole game is derived in section 4. Finally, section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a market for vertically diﬀerentiated products. Let this market
exist over time t,w i t ht ∈ [0,∞). Two single-product ﬁrms, labelled 1 and
2, produce goods of diﬀerent qualities, q1 and q2 ∈ [0,∞), through the same
technology. Without loss of generality we can assume that ﬁrms production






with i =1 ,2 and q ≥ 0. Parameters c and r denote the instantaneous R&D
cost and the instantaneous interest rate, respectively. Development costs
Ci(qi) are evaluated at the beginning of the period of investment, therefore
in 0 for ﬁrm 1 and in t1 for ﬁrm 2. As usual, these costs can be interpreted
as ﬁxed cost due to the R&D eﬀort needed to produce a certain quality. We
characterize the technology represented by the above cost function as follows:
Assumption 1 The instantaneous R&D costs are constant over time and
equal to c.I f ﬁrm i searches for a period of length ti, then it can
3produce a good at most of quality ti and any other lower quality. Once
entered into the market the ﬁrm cannot invest anymore in R&D.
The above amounts to assuming that any change in the quality level
implies adjustment costs if and only if the change takes the form of a quality
increase. Conversely, once ﬁrm i has borne the cost of developing a given
quality, she may decide to decrease the quality of her product costlessly.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that quality is strictly correlated with
t h et i m eo fe n t r y . M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,i fﬁrm 1 enters at time t1,i t sm a x i m u m
feasible quality is t1 = q1. Firm 2’s cost of imitation, however, are exactly
equal to the costs of innovation.3 Equivalently, we can assume that ﬁrm 2
is compelled to self-develop the innovation, since it might wish to produce a
higher quality good. Therefore, ﬁrm 2’s time of entry satisﬁes the equality
t2 = q1 + q2. In the remainder, we shall label the ﬁrst entrant as the leader.
Firm 2 enters at date t2 ∈ [t1,∞), and we shall refer to her as the follower.
Assumption 2 Products are oﬀered on a market where consumers have unit
demands, and buy if and only if the net surplus derived from consump-
tion vθ(qk,p i(qk)) = θqk − pi(qk) ≥ 0, where pi(qk) is the unit price
charged by ﬁrm i on a good of quality qk, purchased by a generic con-
sumer whose marginal willingness to pay is θ ∈ [θ,¯ θ], with θ = ¯ θ − 1.
We assume that θ is uniformly distributed with density one over such
interval, so that the total mass of consumer is one. Throughout the
following analysis, we assume partial market coverage.
The above assumption is rather common in vertically diﬀerentiated prod-
uct models. Parameter θ measures consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for
quality. Given the previous assumption, if ¯ θ increases, the marginal willing-
ness to pay for quality of all consumers increases. Therefore ¯ θ can be thought
of as a measure of dimension of the market. Our most relevant assumption
concerns the timing of the game.
Assumption 3 Firm 1 chooses when to enter the market with the new prod-
uct and simultaneously chooses the quality and the price to be oﬀered.
Then ﬁrm 2 decides whether to imitate ﬁrm 1 and when to enter the
market. Once ﬁrm 2 has entered, the two ﬁrms choose simultaneously
the quality levels, which become common knowledge. Finally both ﬁrms
choose simultaneously the price levels.
3The case for very high imitation costs is supported by empirical ﬁndings (see Mansﬁeld
et al., 1981;a n dL e v i net al., 1987).
4This timing can be justiﬁed as follows. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 has invented
a new product, but it has to decide the quality level of that product before
entry. Since nobody knows the existence of this new product, only ﬁrm 1
can enter ﬁrst. Thereafter, other ﬁrms can imitate ﬁrm 1.S u p p o s eo n l yﬁrm
2 has the necessary technology. However, ﬁrm 2 has to sustain the R&D
costs before being able to enter and this takes time and precisely the period
between t1 and t2.4
3S o l u t i o n o f t h e G a m e
As usual we will solve the game backwards. However, it is useful before
solving the model to introduce two deﬁnitions, concerning ﬁrms’ behavior.
In the remainder, we shall refer to the ﬁrst entrant (ﬁrm 1)a st h eleader,
and to the second entrant (ﬁrm 2) as the follower.W ea r eg o i n gt oe x a m i n e
two alternative perspectives:
A. The follower enters at t2 with a product whose quality is lower than the
leader’s. We label this case as high-quality leadership.
B. The follower enters at t2 with a product whose quality is higher than the
leader’s. We label this case as low-quality leadership.
3.1 The Price Game
In both cases, over t ∈ [t2,∞), ﬁrms compete in prices. We borrow from Aoki
and Prusa (1997) and Lehmann-Grube (1997) the assumption that down-
stream Bertrand competition is simultaneous. Market demands for the high-
and low-quality good are, respectively:










Duopoly revenue functions are RH = pHxH and RL = pLxL. Solving for the
equilibrium prices, we obtain:
pH =2 ¯ θqH
qH − qL
4qH − qL




4To solve the game we adopt subgame perfection, and we look for simultaneous Nash
equilibria in each stage. Considering the Stackelberg solution would make calculations
more cumbersome without aﬀecting signiﬁcantly the main results.










(4qH − qL)2 (5)
On the basis of expressions (4-5), previous literature, dealing with single-
period models, establishes that the ﬁrst entrant would choose to supply the
high-quality good, given that RH >R L. In the remainder, we label the
leader’s quality as q1 and the follower’s quality as either qH or qL,w i t ht h e
understanding that qH ≥ q1 and q1 ≥ qL.
3.2 The Follower’s Quality Choice
We characterize the optimal problem when the follower chooses to enter with
a lower or a higher quality than the leader. In the ﬁnal sections of the paper
we will use this characterization in order to solve the game and in particular
to ascertain the conditions which will induce the follower to enter either with
a lower or with a higher quality. We will deﬁne the two situations entry from
below and entry form above respectively and will be analyzed in a sequel.
3.2.1 Follower’s entry from below
The follower’s proﬁts when entering from below are Π2L, where the subscript
2 denotes the follower (ﬁrm 2) and the subscript L denotes that the ﬁrm has






































5The proof is omitted here, as it is provided by several authors (Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979; Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993; Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Lehmann-Grube, 1997).























We are now able to state a useful result, instrumental for solving the game.
Lemma 1 When entry occurs from below, the follower’s problem can be
transformed into an equivalent one, which depends only on the exogenous
parameter δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2.







2,γ ˜ qL ≡ qL γ˜ q1 ≡ q1
a n ds u b s t i t u t ei n( 6 )w eo b t a i n :
r
c
Π2L (γ˜ qL,γ˜ q1)=
µµ
˜ q1˜ qL(˜ q1 − ˜ qL)
(4˜ q1 − ˜ qL)2 +1
¶
e




Maximizing the right hand side of (7) with respect to ˜ qL is equivalent to (6).
Notice that c and ¯ θ
2 enter precisely in the same way into the problem. The
discount rate r has an independent eﬀect, since it enters in the deﬁnition of
δ, but not in that of ˜ qL. We are now in a position to prove that the follower’s
problem has a solution and to characterize it.
Proposition 2 When entry occurs from below, the follower’s problem has a
solution if δ ∈ [0,1/16] and the solution is characterized by:
argmax
˜ q1
Π2L (γ˜ qL,γ˜ q1)=
4 − 7x − δ (4 − x)
3












Proof. See the Appendix.
The transformation ˜ qL = x˜ q1 allows us to express the ﬁrst order condition
as a linear function of ˜ q1, simplifying considerably the calculations we will
have to carry out below, when substituting the follower’s equilibrium strategy
7into the leader’s problem, as it is necessary for computing the sub-game




−8 − x − 7x(1 − x) − δ (x +2 )( 4− x)
3
δ(1 − x)
2 (4 − x)
2 < 0 (8)
hence ˜ qL is a monotonically decreasing function of x in the relevant range.
3.2.2 Follower’s entry from above
In this paragraph we proceed in an analogous way as the previous one. The
follower’s proﬁts if it enters with the high quality good are denoted by Π2H,
where the subscript 2 denotes the follower (ﬁrm 2) and the subscript H
denotes that the ﬁrm has higher quality than the competitor. The follower































































Also in this case we can prove that the problem can be transformed in a
simpler one, as stated in the following proposition.
Lemma 3 When entry occurs from above, the follower’s problem can be
transformed into an equivalent one, which depends only on the exogenous
parameter δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2.







2,γ ˜ qH ≡ qH γ˜ q1 ≡ q1
8an substitute into (9) we obtain:
r
c
Π2H (γ˜ qH,γ˜ q1)=
µµ
4˜ q2
H(˜ qH − ˜ q1)
(4˜ qH − ˜ q1)2 +1
¶
e




Maximizing the right hand side of (7) with respect to ˜ qH is equivalent to
solving problem (9).
Finally, the existence of a solution for the follower entering from above is
ensured by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When entry occurs from above, the follower’s problem has a
solution, which is characterized by
argmax
˜ q1
Π2H (γ˜ qH,γ˜ q1)=
4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ (4 − x)
3












Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice again that the transformation ˜ q1 = x˜ qH allows to express the ﬁrst
order condition as a linear function of ˜ q1,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes considerably the
solution of sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies of the previous stages of






4(8+x +7 x(1 − x)) − (x +2 )( 4− x)
3 δ
δ(1 − x)
2 (4 − x)
2











2 (1 − x)δ
> 0. (11)
Hence, noticing that ∂˜ qH/∂x is decreasing in δ,w eh a v et h a t∂˜ qH/∂x > 0 in
the relevant range. Therefore, ˜ qH (x) is monotonically increasing in x.
3.3 The Leader’s Quality Choice
The leader has to take two choices on the quality level: one when it enters
as a monopolist and the other when it has to cope with the entry of the
competitor. On the basis of Assumption 1, the second level of quality cannot
exceed the monopoly one. As usual, we start by analyzing the last quality
choice, that when the follower enters.
93.3.1 The Quality in the Last Stage Game
As for the follower, we characterize the optimal choice when entering with
a higher quality than that expected from the follower and with a lower one.
In the following sub-sections we will determine the conditions inducing the
follower to enter either with a lower or with a higher quality than the leader’s.
We will deﬁne the two situations as entry from below and entry form above
respectively and they will be analyzed in a sequel.
Leader’s entry from above First of all notice that once ﬁrm 2 had en-
tered, ﬁrm 1 wishes to produce at the highest quality level in the product
space. It is suﬃcient to compute the derivative of RH with respect to qH
and check that it is always positive. Recall that the R&D costs were already
borne and therefore irrelevant in this stage. Hence:
∂
∂qH
RH =4 ¯ θ
2qH
4q2




which is positive if 4q2
H − 3qHq2 +2 q2
2 > 0. However:
4q
2









where the ﬁrst inequality is an implication of qH ≥ q2.S i n c eq1 ≤ qM,w h e r e
qM is the quality level of monopolist’s product, we can summarize the result
in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If the leader enters with the high quality good, then it will produce
a good of the same quality level before and after follower’s entry.
Leader’s entry from below After ﬁrm 2 had entered the market, the
leader’s optimal quality level is q1 =4 qH/7,i fi te n t e r e dw i t hal o wq u a l i t y .
In fact, in analogy with the entry from above, we have:
∂
∂qL







which indeed implies q1 =4 qH/7.
Recalling that: qH = γ˜ qH and q1 = γ˜ q1,t h ee q u a l i t yq1 =4 qH/7 implies
also ˜ q1 =4 ˜ qH/7. Moreover, recall that in the proof of Proposition 4 we set
x =˜ q1/˜ qH, which for the analysis above must be: x =4 /7. Substituting in






















Lemma 6 If (i) the leader has entered with the low quality good and (ii)
the quality chosen after the follower’s entry is lower than that chosen in the













provided that: δ = cr/¯ θ
2 ≤ 7/24.
3.3.2 Monopoly Phase
After having discussed the choices in the competition game, we have to de-
scribe what happens in the monopoly phase. As usual, we start by describing
the price policy and then the choice of quality, distinguishing between entry
with high and low quality, respectively.
The Monopolist’s Price In the monopoly phase, revenues are RM =
p
¡¯ θ − p/qM
¢
,w h e r eqM is the quality level chosen by ﬁrm 1 when it is a
monopolist. The ﬁrst order conditions for the price is:
¯ θqM − 2p
qM
=0
and hence p = ¯ θqM/2. Substituting again in the proﬁts, it yields RM =
¯ θ
2qM/4.
11Leader’s entry from above The proﬁtf u n c t i o no fﬁrm 1 when entering
from above are denoted by Π1H, where subscript 1 denotes the leader, while
subscript H denotes that the leader entered with the plan to set a higher
quality than the follower’s. Hence:
Π1H (qL,q M)=RM
R qM+qL
qM e−rtdt + RH
R ∞




























Moreover, recall that the corresponding follower’s problem is that where it
e n t e r sf r o mb e l o w .I nt h a tc a s e ,w eh a v eb e e na b l et oe x p r e s st h ef o l l o w e r ’ s
problem in terms of one parameter only, δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2, thus simplifying it sig-
niﬁcantly. It turns out that this is possible also for the leader’s problem.
Lemma 7 When ﬁrm 1 enters from above, the leader’s problem can be trans-
formed into an equivalent one which depends only on the exogenous parameter
δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2.























We already know from the above analysis that, when the follower enters,
the leader will produce the highest quality and hence we have q1 = qM.
Therefore, the leader’s problem is equivalent to maximizing:
ΠMH(qL,q 1)=4
q2


























1 (˜ q1 − ˜ qL)












−δ˜ q1 − γ
Then, deﬁning:
ΠH (˜ qL, ˜ q1)=
1
γ
ΠMH(γ˜ qL,γ˜ q1)+γ =
µµ
4˜ q1 (˜ q1 − ˜ qL)













we obtain that maximizing Π1H is equivalent to maximize ΠH, which depends
only on δ.
The above lemma allows us to simplify considerably the leader’s problem,
even though it remains indeed rather cumbersome. In fact, we have to opti-
mize using backward induction, which implies that we have to introduce the
follower’s ﬁrst order condition inside the leader’s problem. However, using
again the variable x =˜ qL/˜ q1 = qL/q1, the proﬁt function of the leader can
be further transformed in the following:














Finally, using ˜ qL and considering the fact that it is monotone in x for (8),




4 − 7x − δ(4 − x)
3
δ (1 − x)(4− x)
,
4 − 7x − δ(4 − x)
3
δx(1 − x)(4− x)
!
(12)
which is still computationally a complicated problem, but in principle it is
the maximization of a function of a single variable and a single parameter.
Therefore the function can be easily represented graphically. Finally, recall
that we need to impose δ ≤ (4 − 7x)/(4 − x)
3 in order to make the follower’s
problem meaningful. Given the additional restrictions x ≤ 4/7 and δ ≤ 1/16
(see the proof of Proposition 2), we can carry out an exploration of the
monopolist proﬁt function in Figure 1, highlighting the existence of a global









Figure 1:P r o ﬁt of the leader when entering from above






4 − 7x − δ(4 − x)
3
δ(1 − x)(4− x)
,
4 − 7x − δ(4 − x)
3
δx(1 − x)(4− x)
!
=0 (13)
cannot be solved analytically. However, we can draw the implicit plot in
Figure 2. The dotted line plots the locus δ =( 4 − 7x)/(4 − x)
3.T h e r e -
fore, only the area below the dotted line satisﬁes δ<(4 − 7x)/(4 − x)
3.
T h ec o n t i n u o u sl i n eb e l o wt h ed o t t e do n ei st h el o c u so ft h eg l o b a lm a x i m a
of the proﬁt function, as established by comparing Figure 1 and 2.We can
summarize the graphical analysis above in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The problem of the leader entering with the high quality and
correctly anticipating that the follower will respond with a lower quality has
a solution, characterized by ∂ΠH/∂x =0for any δ ∈ [0,1/16].
Leader’s entry from below The analysis of this case is very similar to
that of the previous one. The proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 when entering from
below is denoted by Π1L where the subscript 1 denotes the leader, while
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Figure 2: First order condition for the leader when entering from above
quality than the response of the follower. We have:
Π1L = RM
R qM+qH
qM e−rtdt + RL
R ∞




























Moreover, recall that the corresponding problem of the follower is that where
it enters from below. Also in that case we were able to express the follower’s
problem as depending on one parameter only, δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2. Likewise, for the
leader’s problem we can formulate the following:
Lemma 9 When ﬁrm 1 enters from below, the leader’s problem can be trans-
formed into an equivalent one which depends only on the exogenous parameter
δ ≡ rc/¯ θ
2.
15Proof. The leader proﬁts can be rewritten as:
r
¯ θ

























2,γ ˜ qM = qM γ˜ qL ≡ qL,γ ˜ qH ≡ qH
we have that:
ΠML(˜ qM, ˜ qH, ˜ qL)=
1
γ
Π1L (γ˜ qM,γ˜ qH,γ˜ qL) − γ = (14)
µµ
˜ qH˜ qL
˜ qH − ˜ qL














where it is obvious that maximizing ΠML with respect to ˜ qM is equivalent to
maximizing Π1L with respect to qM.
I np r i n c i p l eh e r ew eh a v et oc o n s i d e rt w oc a s e s .I nf a c t ,f o rδ ≤ 7/24 it is
possible that the leader oﬀers a higher quality good when monopolist than
after the follower had entered. We will prove that this is not the case.
Proposition 10 Irrespective of whether the leader enters with the low or
the high quality, the quality of the leader after the follower had entered the
market coincides with the optimal monopoly quality, i.e., q1 = qM.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given the above proposition we can analyze only the cases where the
monopolist’s choice is binding in the duopoly phase, that is, where ˜ qM =˜ qL.
In such a case, setting ˜ qM =˜ qL =˜ q1 the leader’s proﬁts (14) become:
ΠL (˜ qH, ˜ q1)=ΠML(˜ q1, ˜ qH, ˜ q1)=
µµ
˜ qH˜ q1
˜ qH − ˜ q1














Even though we have simpliﬁed also this problem, it is still computationally
cumbersome. However, using again the variable x =˜ q1/˜ qH = q1/qH,t h e




























4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ(4 − x)
3
4δ(4 − x)(1− x)
,x
4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ (4 − x)
3
4δ (4 − x)(1− x)
!
(15)
Once again we resort to graphical analysis because it is impossible to ﬁnd
a closed form solution. However, we have again a function of one variable
and one parameter and the graphical analysis can help us to characterize the
solution. Using restriction δ ≤ 4(4− 3x +2 x2)/(4 − x)
3, we can produce a
graphical exploration of the problem in Figure 3. It shows that the function






4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ (4 − x)
3
4δ (4 − x)(1− x)
,x
4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ(4 − x)
3
4δ(4 − x)(1− x)
!
(16)
and it is not solvable analytically. However, its implicit plot is in Figure 4.We
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Figure 4: Leader’s ﬁrst order condition when entering from below
Proposition 11 The problem of the leader entering with the low quality and
correctly anticipating that the follower will respond with a higher quality has
a solution, characterized by ∂ΠL/∂x =0for any δ.
4 I si tC o n v e n i e n tt oE n t e rt h eM a r k e tw i t h
a High-quality Product?
Now we can solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game by
determining whether the leader will enter with a high or a low quality. We
ﬁrst prove a preliminary result.
Lemma 12 No equilibrium with the follower entering the market with a
lower quality than the leader does exist if δ = rc/¯ θ
2 > 1/16.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the restriction δ ≤ 1/16.
We are now in the position to prove the main lemma of this section.




there is no subgame
perfect equilibrium with the follower entering the market and the leader pro-







no equilibrium with the follower entering the market and the leader producing










Figure 5: Proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 when entering with high (dash) and when entering
with low (solid) quality.
Proof. We solve numerically equations (13) and (16), ﬁnding the optimal
x for the two problems for various values of δ. The computed values are re-
ported in the Table 1-3 of the Appendix in columns denoted respectively by
xHL and xLH. By using the expression for ˜ q1, we can compute ˜ q∗
1 (xHL(δ),δ)
and ˜ q∗
L (xHL(δ),δ)=xHL(δ)· ˜ q∗
1 (xHL(δ),δ), the optimal values of trans-
formed variables replacing qL and q1.B yu s i n g˜ qH we can compute, instead,
˜ q∗
H (xLH (δ),δ) and ˜ q∗
1 (xLH (δ),δ)=xLH (δ)· ˜ q∗
H (xLH (δ),δ).G i v e nt h ev a r -
ious level of qualities, the proﬁts of the monopolist entering from above and
e n t e r i n gf r o mb e l o wc a nb ec o m p u t e da n da r ed r a w ni nF i g u r e5 .I tc a nb e
seen that the proﬁt of the low quality monopolist are higher for lower level
of δ and lower thereafter. The two curves cross at ¯ δ.
The above proposition suggests that the equilibrium should have the fol-
lowing form: when δ<¯ δ the leader enters with a low quality good and the
follower responds with a higher quality and for δ>¯ δ the opposite is true
(while when δ = ¯ δ both equilibria are available). However, before proving
such a result we need to exclude the proﬁtability of other possible deviations.
First, the leader might have an incentive to monopolize the market. Second,
if the leader enters with a high quality it might be the case that the follower
wishes to enter with an even higher one, that is to leap-frog the leader. Third,
if the leader enters with a low quality the follower might ﬁnd it convenient to
undercut the leader’s quality. The next three propositions take care of these
19three possibilities, respectively.
Proposition 14 For δ suﬃciently small, there exists no subgame perfect
equilibrium where the leader succeeds in monopolizing the market. In partic-
ular, δ ≤ 1/16 is a suﬃcient condition for the leader not to be able to prevent
the entry of the follower.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition, we must check that he follower
can always enter with a lower quality for any choice of the leader, making
positive proﬁts. Recall that the optimal choice of the follower is expressed
by ˜ q1, which is re-written for convenience as:
˜ qL =
4 − 7x − δ (4 − x)
3
δ(1 − x)(4− x)










˜ q1˜ qL(˜ q1 − ˜ qL)
(4˜ q1 − ˜ qL)2 +1
¶
e

















Notice that if δ =( 4− 7x)/(4 − x)
3, then the follower’s proﬁts are nought,
otherwise they are positive for any admissible values of x and δ.
The only possible candidate equilibrium strategy proﬁles left are those
with the leader entering with the low quality and the follower responding
with a higher one and the other where the opposite happens, depending on
the value of the composite parameter δ. However, we still have to ascertain
whether it is optimal for the follower to respond with a higher (lower) quality
if the leader enters with a low (high) one. This is done in the following two
propositions.
Proposition 15 If δ ∈
¡¯ δ,1/16
¤
, t h el e a d e re n t e r sw i t hah i g hq u a l i t ya n d














Figure 6: The leader enters with the high quality. Follower’s proﬁts when
choosing the low one (solid) and the high one (dots).
Proof. The only thing we need to check is whether the follower responds
with a lower quality. This proof is conceptually similar to that of Lemma
13. We can compute numerically ˜ q∗
1 (xHL(δ),δ) and ˜ q∗
L (xHL(δ),δ).W i t h
the two levels of quality we can compute numerically ﬁrm’s 2 proﬁta sf r o m
equation (7). Moreover, using the ﬁrst order condition of the follower when
entering from above, we can compute numerically the corresponding value
of x, for any given q1 and δ.T h o s ev a l u e so fx are reported in the tables of




1 (xHL(δ),δ)/x HH, which is the optimal response if the follower
tries to leap-frog the leader. Finally, we use ˜ q∗
1 (xHL(δ),δ) and ˜ q∗
H (˜ q∗
1,δ) to
compute the follower’s proﬁt when deviating and entering with the high
quality using (10). We provide here the graphical representation of the two
levels of proﬁt of the follower showing that the follower makes higher proﬁts
when producing the low quality and therefore that she will never deviate
from the low quality.




, the leader enters with a low quality and the
follower will always respond with a higher one.
Proof. The only thing we need to prove is that the follower responds with
a higher quality and does not undercut the leader. Relying on the proof of
Lemma 13, we can compute ˜ q∗
H (xLH (δ),δ) and ˜ q∗










Figure 7: The leader enters with the low quality. Follower’s proﬁts when
choosing the high one (solid) and the low one (dots).
two levels of quality we can compute numerically Firm’s 2 proﬁta sf r o m
equation (10). Moreover, using the ﬁrst order condition of the follower when
entering from below, we can compute numerically the appropriate value of
x,f o ra n yg i v e nq1 and δ.T h o s e v a l u e s o f x a r er e p o r t e di nt h et a b l e so f




1 (xLH (δ),δ),t h ef o l l o w e r ’ so p t i m a ld e v i a t i o nw h e n
she tries to undercut the leader, and then use ˜ q∗
1 (xLH (δ),δ) and ˜ q∗
L(˜ q∗
1,δ)
to compute the follower’s proﬁt when deviating and entering with the low
quality using (7). We provide here the graphical representation of the two
proﬁt levels of the follower showing that the follower never deviates from the
high quality for any δ<¯ δ ≈ 0.0203125.
Therefore we can summarize the above analysis in the following corollary.




, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
with the follower entering the market and the leader producing the low quality
good. For δ ∈
¡¯ δ,1/16
¤
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with
the follower entering the market and the leader producing the high quality
good. For δ = ¯ δ both equilibria do exist. The value of ¯ δ is approximately δ =
0.0203125.
A few remarks are now in order. First, a trivial one, refers to δ = ¯ δ.F o r
that value of δ both equilibria hold. However, while the leader is indiﬀerent






Figure 8: q2H (dash) and q2L (solid) for various levels of δ.
between the two equilibria, the follower makes higher proﬁts if the leader en-
ters with he low quality. Second, recall that δ = rc/¯ θ
2.T h et w oP r o p o s i t i o n s
15a n d16 together imply that in the interval [0,1/16] there exist a subgame









will choose a high quality. That is, the leader will enter with the high quality
for low levels of r and with the high quality for high levels of r, for given c
and ¯ θ.
The intuition of the result is as follows. For low δ
0s, the quality chosen
by both ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher, in both candidate equilibria, with low
and high quality leadership alike. In particular the follower’s quality is very
high in both allocations. However, it is signiﬁcantly higher when it enters
with the highest quality, as can be checked in Figure 8. This implies that the
leader will remain a monopolist for a signiﬁcantly longer period if it enters
with the low quality than with the high one. This is the driving force that
makes it convenient to enter with the low quality when δ is low. It is also
rather intuitive that c should have similar eﬀects as r,w h i l e¯ θ should have
the opposite ones. That is, any decrease in c and/or r, and any increase in
¯ θ, imply a decrease in δ.
Finally, we should like to assess our results against those of Lehmann-
Grube (1997) and Dutta et al. (19 9 5 ) ,s oa st oe v a l u a t eh o wd i ﬀerent as-
sumptions about the time horizon and the technology aﬀect the features of
23the subgame perfect equilibrium. Lehmann-Grube (1997) generalizes the
analysis conducted by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) to account for a tech-
nology which is convex in the quality level, but remains in a single-phase
model where there exist no monopoly periods. This produces the result that
surplus extraction is maximized when the ﬁrm locates at the top of the avail-
able quality spectrum.
In Dutta et al. (1995), it is assumed that (i) per-period operative duopoly
proﬁts are proportional to relative quality and are symmetric; (ii) adoption
(entry) dates are endogenous, while (iii) the growth of quality over time is
not endogenously determined by ﬁrms; (iv) unit production cost is ﬂat w.r.t.
quality; and (v) innovation costs are summarized by the waiting time before
the adoption. In this setup, the authors ﬁnd that a later entrant obtains
larger proﬁts than an earlier entrant, and no monopoly rent is dissipated at
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In our setting, the entry timing is endogenously linked to quality improve-
ment, and the cost borne to supply superior qualities can be high enough to
oﬀset the advantage attached to serving rich customers. The interplay of
these factors may entail that, in some relevant parameter ranges, all ﬁrms
would prefer to enter early with an inferior quality rather than late with a
superior one.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the bearings of R&D expenditures in continuous time
over the entry process in a market for vertically diﬀerentiated goods.
We have shown that entering ﬁrst and enjoying an ad interim monopoly
rent may counterbalance the incentive towards the supply of high quality
goods in duopoly after the entry of a second innovator. Indeed, we have
proved that this is the only subgame perfect equilibrium in a signiﬁcant range
of parameters, namely, the parameter region where discounting is low, quality
improvements are comparatively inexpensive and the marginal willingness to
pay for quality is high. all of these elements contribute to make the monopoly
phase more attractive from the leader’s standpoint, ultimately inducing the
ﬁrst entrant to supply a low-quality variety.
The foregoing analysis shows that the established wisdom produced by
previous literature in this ﬁeld does not properly account for the role of time
and its interaction with R&D technology in determining ﬁrms’ incentives.
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(7˜ qL − 4˜ q1)(˜ q1)
2 + δ˜ q1˜ qL (˜ q1 − ˜ qL)(4˜ q1 − ˜ qL)+δ(4˜ q1 − ˜ qL)
3
(4˜ q1 − ˜ qL)
3 =0
One could obviously solve the ﬁrst and second order conditions for ˜ qL,e v e n
though the solution of a third order polynomial is rather cumbersome. How-










4 − 7x − δ (4 − x)
3
δx(1 − x)(4− x)
(a1)
and:
˜ qL = x˜ q1 =
4 − 7x − δ (4 − x)
3
δ (1 − x)(4− x)
Notice that in order to have ˜ qL ≥ 0 we must impose




w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s :
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2 +4 0 x − 16
¢
< 0
Notice that (a2) implies that the polynomial is increasing in δ. Therefore
if the inequality is satisﬁed for δ =( 4 − 7x)/(4 − x)
3 is satisﬁed for all





2 + x − 8
¢
< 0
which is always satisﬁed.¥





(4˜ qH − ˜ q1)
3 +4˜ q2
H (˜ qH − ˜ q1)(4˜ qH − ˜ q1)
¢
δ − 4˜ qH (4˜ q2
H − 3˜ qH˜ q1 +2˜ q2
1)
(4˜ qH − ˜ q1)
3 =0





4δ(1 − x)(4− x)˜ qH − 4
¡
4 − 3x +2 x
2¢
+ δ(4 − x)
3¢
which is nought if:
˜ qH =
4(4− 3x +2 x2) − δ(4 − x)
3
4δ(4 − x)(1− x)
. (a3)
Notice that in order to have ˜ qH ≥ 0 we must impose:
0 ≤ δ ≤ 4






The second order condition is:
−
e−δ˜ q1e−δ˜ qH
(4˜ qH − ˜ q1)
4
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which computed in (a3) becomes:
−(−3x +2 x2 +4 )( 4− x)
3 δ +4( −24x +3 5 x2 − 20x3 +2 x4 + 16)
1 − x
> 0.
Now note that the numerator is decreasing in δ. Therefore if the inequality
is satisﬁed for the highest value of δ, then it is always satisﬁed. Using (a4)




2 +4 x − 5
¢
> 0,
always met except for x ∈ {0,1}, where it is nought.¥
Proof of Proposition 10. Notice that the proposition can be false only
for the leader entering from below when δ ≤ 7/24.R e l y i n go nt h i sf a c t ,w e
proceed to characterise the proof by contradiction. From Proposition 6 we
would have:










and substituting in (14) we obtain:











































7 δ−2 − 1
´
However, again by Proposition 6 the following inequality should hold: ˜ qM ≥
29˜ qL and hence:
(49 − 24δ)e
48















7 δ + 984e−2+ 48




7 δ − 1
´ ≥ 0
The numerator is positive. Therefore the inequality implies δ>7/24,a
contradiction.¥
30Table 1: Numerical solutions of the ﬁrms’ problems.
Low value of δ.
Entry from below Entry from above
δx LH xLL xHL xHH
0.000625 0.5710955777 0.4252061589 0.4237058956 0.2092704695
0.001250 0.5710989664 0.4215844866 0.4203553403 0.2074909267
0.001875 0.5711018893 0.4179537220 0.4169942492 0.2056948230
0.002500 0.5711043377 0.4143137629 0.4136224093 0.2038821871
0.003125 0.5711063032 0.4106645062 0.4102396054 0.2020530634
0.003750 0.5711077769 0.4070058473 0.4068456203 0.2002074979
0.004375 0.5711087500 0.4033376809 0.4034402348 0.1983455435
0.005000 0.5711092133 0.3996598999 0.4000232276 0.1964672625
0.005625 0.5711091574 0.3959723970 0.3965943754 0.1945727202
0.006250 0.5711085732 0.3922750625 0.3931534528 0.1926619948
0.006875 0.5711074507 0.3885677869 0.3897002322 0.1907351684
0.007500 0.5711057807 0.3848504580 0.3862344841 0.1887923325
0.008125 0.5711035528 0.3811229631 0.3827559768 0.1868335893
0.008750 0.5711007573 0.3773851884 0.3792644768 0.1848590436
0.009375 0.5710973838 0.3736370179 0.3757597481 0.1828688159
0.010000 0.5710934220 0.3698783352 0.3722415530 0.1808630310
0.010625 0.5710888610 0.3661090221 0.36870965160 . 1788418249
0.011250 0.5710836905 0.3623289590 0.36516380190 . 1768053412
0.011875 0.5710778990 0.3585380248 0.3616037600 0.1747537347
0.012500 0.5710714757 0.3547360970 0.3580292799 0.1726871712
0.013125 0.5710644090 0.3509230515 0.3544401135 0.1706058225
0.013750 0.5710566875 0.3470987630 0.3508360106 0.1685098810
0.014375 0.5710482994 0.3432631042 0.3472167191 0.1663995359
0.015000 0.5710392326 0.3394159465 0.3435819850 0.1642749982
0.015625 0.5710294752 0.3355571593 0.3399315520 0.1621364858
0.016250 0.5710190143 0.3316866107 0.3362651620 0.1599842274
0.016875 0.5710078378 0.3278041673 0.3325825548 0.1578184683
0.017500 0.5709959325 0.3239096932 0.3288834683 0.1556394605
0.018125 0.5709832856 0.3200030513 0.3251676384 0.1534474724
0.018750 0.5709698835 0.3160841028 0.3214347991 0.1512427825
0.019375 0.5709557124 0.3121527066 0.3176846822 0.1490256846
0.020000 0.5709407591 0.3082087198 0.3139170180 0.1467964828
0.020625 0.5709250091 0.3042519977 0.3101315343 0.1445554960
31Table 2: Numerical solutions of the ﬁrms’ problems.
Intermediate value of δ.
Entry from below Entry from above
δx LH xLL xHL xHH
0.021250 0.5709084481 0.3002823939 0.3063279576 0.1423030611
0.021875 0.5708910616 0.2962997593 0.30250601190 . 1400395220
0.022500 0.5708728346 0.2923039433 0.2986654198 0.1377652416
0.023125 0.5708537521 0.2882947929 0.29480590180 . 1354805970
0.023750 0.5708337985 0.2842721533 0.2909271764 0.1331859775
0.024375 0.5708129580 0.2802358667 0.2870289604 0.1308817922
0.025000 0.5707912150 0.2761857738 0.2831109687 0.1285684678
0.025625 0.5707685527 0.2721217130 0.2791729145 0.1262464329
0.026250 0.5707449547 0.2680435198 0.2752145090 0.1239161526
0.026875 0.5707204040 0.2639510277 0.27123546160 . 1215780901
0.027500 0.5706948832 0.2598440676 0.2672354799 0.1192327367
0.028125 0.5706683748 0.2557224678 0.2632142698 0.1168805932
0.028750 0.5706408607 0.2515860543 0.2591715353 0.1145221874
0.029375 0.5706123228 0.2474346499 0.2551069787 0.1121580586
0.030000 0.5705827422 0.2432680753 0.2510203005 0.1097887570
0.030625 0.5705521000 0.2390861482 0.2469111995 0.1074148657
0.031250 0.5705203767 0.2348886833 0.2427793726 0.1050369829
0.031875 0.5704875525 0.2306754927 0.2386245150 0.1026557079
0.032500 0.5704536073 0.2264463850 0.2344463204 0.1002716774
0.033125 0.5704185202 0.2222011666 0.2302444803 0.0978855505
0.033750 0.5703822707 0.2179396398 0.2260186850 0.0954979899
0.034375 0.5703448369 0.2136616045 0.2217686227 0.0931096840
0.035000 0.5703061971 0.2093668569 0.2174939800 0.0907213469
0.035625 0.5702663289 0.2050551901 0.2131944419 0.0883337068
0.036250 0.5702252095 0.2007263935 0.2088696914 0.0859475081
0.036875 0.5701828157 0.1963802531 0.2045194100 0.0835635313
0.037500 0.5701391237 0.1920165513 0.2001432774 0.0811825600
0.038125 0.5700941095 0.1876350669 0.1957409718 0.0788054078
0.038750 0.5700477480 0.1832355747 0.1913121692 0.0764329080
0.039375 0.5700000141 0.1788178457 0.1868565444 0.0740659098
0.040000 0.5699508820 0.1743816469 0.1823737701 0.0717052971
0.040625 0.5699003253 0.16992674140 . 1778635173 0.0693519571
0.041250 0.5698483171 0.1654528876 0.1733254556 0.0670068124
32Table 3: Numerical solutions of the ﬁrms’ problem.
High value of δ.
Entry from below Entry from above
δx LH xLL xHL xHH
0.041875 0.5697948299 0.1609598402 0.1687592523 0.0646707925
0.042500 0.5697398357 0.1564473490 0.1641645734 0.0623448659
0.043125 0.5696833057 0.1519151595 0.1595410828 0.0600300129
0.043750 0.5696252105 0.1473630125 0.1548884429 0.0577272307
0.044375 0.5695655203 0.1427906439 0.1502063139 0.0554375448
0.045000 0.5695042043 0.1381977848 0.1454943546 0.0531619999
0.045625 0.56944123130 . 13358416130 . 1407522217 0.0509016549
0.046250 0.5693765691 0.1289494940 0.1359795701 0.0486575954
0.046875 0.5693101851 0.1242934986 0.1311760528 0.0464309355
0.047500 0.5692420458 0.1196158850 0.1263413209 0.0442227972
0.048125 0.5691721169 0.1149163575 0.1214750236 0.0420343272
0.048750 0.5691003633 0.1101946149 0.1165768081 0.0398666744
0.049375 0.5690267493 0.1054503495 0.1116463198 0.0377210423
0.050000 0.5689512381 0.1006832480 0.1066832018 0.0355986197
0.050625 0.5688737922 0.0958929905 0.1016870953 0.0335006319
0.051250 0.5687943732 0.0910792507 0.0966576396 0.0314283115
0.051875 0.5687129417 0.0862416955 0.0915944716 0.0293829044
0.052500 0.5686294573 0.0813799851 0.0864972263 0.0273656750
0.053125 0.5685438792 0.0764937725 0.0813655364 0.0253779143
0.053750 0.5684561647 0.0715827035 0.0761990324 0.0234209261
0.054375 0.5683662708 0.0666464162 0.0709973427 0.0214960158
0.055000 0.5682741531 0.0616845411 0.0657600932 0.0196044799
0.055625 0.5681797662 0.0566967009 0.0604869077 0.0177476705
0.056250 0.5680830636 0.0516825096 0.0551774074 0.0159268892
0.056875 0.5679839975 0.0466415730 0.04983121130 . 0 141435302
0.057500 0.5678825190 0.0415734883 0.0444479358 0.0123989271
0.058125 0.5677785781 0.0364778434 0.0390271949 0.0106944486
0.058750 0.5676721233 0.0313542170 0.0335686000 0.0090314093
0.059375 0.5675631020 0.0262021781 0.0280717598 0.0074112368
0.060000 0.5674514598 0.0210212859 0.0225362806 0.0058352248
0.060625 0.56733714150 . 0 158110892 0.0169617657 0.0043047257
0.061250 0.5672200899 0.0105711263 0.0113478159 0.0028211172
0.061875 0.5671002466 0.0053009246 0.0056940290 0.0013857253
33